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I.

ARGUMENT

A. Spousal cousent was not obtained and therefore the change of beneficiary is
ineffective.

Appellant, Tammy Dixson ("Tammy") asserts that Idaho Code § 41-1803
govems the nature of the Banner Life Insurance Policy (the "Policy") at issue in this case.
Tammy's. position is that the Policy which insured her husband, Mark Dixson, is her
separate property pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1803 and that the Trial Court en-ed in
failing to apply Idaho Code § 41-1803 in this case. Tammy relies not only upon Idaho
Code§ 41-1803 as the basis for her appeal of the Trial Court's decision, but also relies
upon the terms of the Policy which require that the insured's spouse consent to any
change of beneficiary by designating such consent in writing on the Change of
Beneficiary Form provided by the insurer.
The Mark Wallace Dixson Revocable Living Trust (the "Trust") contends that
Idaho Code § 41-1803 is inapplicable to the instant case and that it "excludes situations
where the terms of the policy provide for something other than is provided by the
statute." (Respondent's Brief, p. 10). The Trust emphasizes that the Policy provides for a
change in beneficiary, thus taking the Policy outside of the application of Idaho Code
§ 41-1803. The Trust further concedes that a change in beneficiary "can only be

accomplished in the manner pointed out in the policy," and that "any attempt to make
such change in any other manner is ineffectual." (Respondent's Brief, p. 10, citing Noyes
v. Noyes, 106 Idaho 352,356,649 P.2d at 156 (Ct.App. 1984).

In this case, Mark Wallace Dixson ("Mark") attempted to change the
beneficiary of the Policy by execution ofa Change of Beneficiary Form provided by the
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insurer, Banner Life, through his attorney-in-fact, Robert Young. The Policy provides for
the method of filing a change of beneficiary form (R. Vol. I, P. 41). The Change of
Beneficiary Form, which requires that a spouse in the State ofldaho evidence his or her
consent to the change of beneficiary by signing the Change of Beneficiary Form, is a part
of the insurance contract. Idaho Code§ 41-1802 defines an insurance policy as " ... the
written contract of or written agreement for or effecting insurance, by whatever name
called, and includes all clauses, riders, endorsements and papers which are a part
thereof." The Change of Beneficiary Form becomes a part of the insurance contract.
There is no dispute that Tammy did not sign the Change of Beneficiary Form, nor was
she ever asked to. Tammy did not consent to the change of beneficiary, removing her as
the beneficiary ofhet husband's life insurance policy. (R. Vol. I, P. 41; P. 102A, ex 8, ,i.
27).
The Trust seeks to have this Court apply the terms of the insurance contract in
order to circumvent Idaho Code § 41-1830, but conveniently ignores the fact that the
insurance contract includes the Change of Beneficiary Form and that such form requires
written spousal consent to the change in beneficiary. Application of the Trust's argument
for the application of the Policy terms requires that spousal consent be given. The trial
court erred in failing to enforce the Policy terms.
The Trial Court erred in failing to apply Idaho Code § 41-1830 by holding that
Idaho Code § 41-1830 does not create an exception to community property law. The
Trust cites the Revised Code of Washington 48.18.440(1) and the Washington Supreme
Court's decision in Madsen v. Comm 'n of Internal Revenue, 97 Wash.2d 792, 650 P.2d
196 (1982), overruled on other grounds, in support of its argument that Idaho Code § 41-

2

1830 does not convert community property life insurance policies into the sole and
separate property of the beneficiary spouse. The Court in Madsen was confronted with
question of whether RCW 48.18.440(1) converted "community property life insurance
policies into the sole and separate property of the beneficiary spouse." Id. The
Washington Supreme Court held that "the statute was limited to the 'proceeds' of a
policy and did not change the community character of the underlying policy, despite
statutory language indicating that the policy was to 'inure to the separate use' of the
beneficiary spouse." Id. at 799-800. The Court in Madsen noted that RCW 48.18.440(1)
"does not alter the general rule that absent clear and convincing proof to the contrary, the
proceeds of
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life insurance policy purchased with community funds retain the

community property character of the funds used to purchase the policy." Id. at 799.
Thus, even applying this analysis to Idaho Code§ 41-1830, the Trust would need
to present clear and convincing evidence that the insurance policy was not purchased
with community funds. Tammy's position is that the policy was purchased during the
marriage, and was paid for with community funds. There is a genuine issue of material
fact with regard to whether the premiums paid by Cory Armstrong were a gift solely to
Mark, or to the community. Given that Tammy's recollection, as set forth in her sworn
statement, contradicts with Cory Armstrong's statements, there is not clear and
convincing evidence that the funds used to pay the last Policy premium were not
community. The "manner and method of acquisition of property, as well as the parties'
treatment of that property, are questions of fact." Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571, 573, 75
P.2d 77 (1988). The Magistrate's conclusion in the case at bar that the premium payments
were gifts to Mark, thereby making the premium payments Mark's separate property,
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ignores the disputed facts which are material to this case.
The Trust also argues Idaho Code§ 41-1830 is unconstitutional on the basis that it
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This argument is
likewise without merit and must be rejected. The District Court did not make a
determination of the constitutionality of Idaho Code § 41-1830 on the basis that the
District Court did not intend to rely upon Idaho Code § 41-1830 in making its ruling. (Tr.
Vol. I, P. 29, II. 14-25). The District Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of
Idaho Code§ 41-1830 in its Memorandum Decision and Order. (R. Vol. I, P. 82).
The Trust's assertion that Idaho Code§ 41-1830 is unconstitutional was
addressed in length in the Reply Memorandum in Opposition to the Mark Wallace
Dixson 's Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support of Tammie Sue Dixson 's Motion
for Summary J~dgment. It is Tammy's position that Idaho Code § 41-1830 does not give
a preference to women only to the detriment of males. The statute simply provides that
"every policy of life insurance ... made payable to or for the benefit of a married
woman ... whether procured by herself, her husband ... shall inure to her separate use and
benefit." Idaho Code § 41-1830. The statute simply creates a separate property interest in
the proceeds of the life insurance policy. In this sense, the statute is distinguishable from
the statutes found to be unconstitutional in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.71, 75-76, 92 S.Ct.
251, 253-54, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971) (preference to males over females to administer an
estate) and Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S.Ct.1102, 59 L.Ed.2d 225 (1979) (invalidating a
statute providing that wives, but not husbands could receive alimony). There is nothing
in Idaho Code § 41-1830 which prohibits an insurance policy payable to or for the benefit
of a married man as his separate property. Therefore, the statute clearly does exclude
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males from the class of persons entitled to receive insurance proceeds, and is not in
violation of the equal protection clause of the constitution.
And, in any event, even a finding that the statute is unconstitutional on its face, it
is not necessarily and automatically nullified. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that
"a determination of constitutional infirmity does not conclude the case." Nevau v. Nevau
103 Idaho 707,709,652 P.2 655,657 (Idaho Ct. App.1982), citing Orr vs. Orr, 440 U.S.
279, 99 S.Ct. at Ill. The Court in Nevau recognized that a determination of
constitutional infirmities does not nullify the statute if the statute could be upheld on
other grounds. (see e.g., Nevau v. Nevau 103 Idaho 707,709,652 P.2 655,657 (Idaho Ct.
App.1982), citing Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 279, 99 S.Ct. at 111.) The reasoning expressed by
the Court of Appeals in Nevau is applicable to the case at bar. Specifically, it is clear that
the legislature intended, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1830 and its predecessor, Idaho
Code§ 1401, that when a wife is named as a beneficiary to a life insurance policy, that
the proceeds are her separate property. As noted above, there is nothing in the statute
which prevents a life insurance policy to be taken out on the wife's life naming the
husband as the beneficiary. As such, Idaho Code§ 41-1830, even if the statute is found
to be unconstitutional, it can be extended to provide for the husband to have a separate
property interest, rather then to nullify the statute as to the husband's right. Given the
analysis for determining the constitutionality of such statutes as approved by and utilized
by the Idaho appellate courts, the Trust's argument that Idaho Code§ 41-1830 is
unconstitutional must be rejected.
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B. It is inequitable to allow profit by direct and intentional violation of the Joint
Temporary Restraining Order

The Trust's argument that the Joint Temporary Restraining Order did not apply
because the Policy was Mark's separate property and "it was not held for the benefit of
the parties ... " is invalid because it is premised upon the erroneous conclusion that the
Policy was Mark's separate property. (Respondent's Brief at p. 22). The Trust argues at
the outset of its brief that the Policy terms govern the change of beneficiary. Tammy
agrees that the insurance contract itself, which encompasses all policy terms, riders,
endorsements, and policy forms, governs the protocol for changing a beneficiary. It
follows, then, that in order to effectively change the beneficiary from Tammy to Jackie
Young, Mark or his agent, would be required to complete all required portions of the
Change of Beneficiary Form. The Change of Beneficiary fonn requires that Tammy
consent to the change of beneficiary. This requirement is not hidden or in fine print, but is
found directly below the signature line where Robert Young signed the Change of
Beneficiary Form on not one, but two, occasions. Given that the Policy terms were not,
by the Trust's own admission, complied with, the purported Change of Beneficiary Form
is invalid.
The Trust's argument that the Joint Temporary Restraining Order did not apply to
the Policy is also without merit because the Joint Temporary Restraining Order required
the parties to the pending divorce action initiated by Mark, to "maintain the status quo
regarding their property." (R. Vol. I, P. 102A, ex 8, ex 14 and ex A thereto.) Thus, even if
the property was arguably, at the time of the divorce filing, Mark's separate property
(which Tammy disputes), the Joint Temporary Restraining Order prohibited Mark from
making any changes until the divorce court could characterize the nature of the Policy as
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separate property or community property. The purpose of the Joint Temporary
Restraining Order, as set forth in Appellant's Brief and the cases cited therein, is to
ensure that neither party disposes of any asset during the pendency of the divorce. The
Court can not hold Mark in contempt for the violation of the Joint Temporary Restraining
Order because he is deceased. Tammy had no knowledge of the attempted change of
beneficiary until after Mark's death, so she could hardly challenge the validity of the
change during the divorce action. The Trust cites Alloway v. Smith, 70 Arz. 364, 370, 220
P.2d 857, 861 (1950) for the proposition that transfers made to "im1ocentthird parties"
are not void or voidable. (Respondent's Brief at p. 23). The Alloway case is factually
distinguishable. In the instant case, there was not a transfer to an innocent third party;
rather, the attorney-in-fact for Mark, who had knowledge of the divorce proceeding,
transferred the property which was subject to the terms of the Joint Temporary
Restraining Order and stood to profit from the transfer. The Trust which is the pmiy to
this action was not the proposed beneficiary. Jackie Young was the beneficiary named
without Tammy's consent or knowledge.
The Trust cites Davis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 331 F.2d 346 (5 th Cir.
1964) for the proposition that the effect of the injunction does not void the prohibited
transfer. The Davis court recognized that a fraud had been perpetrated by the decedent in
changing the beneficiary of his life insurance policy and held that the wife was in fact
entitled to her community interest in the proceeds. The Court in American Family Life
Insurance Company v. Noruk, 528 N.W.2 nd 921 (Minn. 1995), held that

[W]hen a life insurance policy's designated beneficiary is changed in violation of
a dissolution court's temporary order, and the death of one of the parties
intercedes before a final judgment is rendered, equitable considerations control in

7

determining the ownership of policy proceeds ... The decedent's wrongful act
should be considered in determining the relative equities of the proceed
claimants ... Other factors, such as the wrongfulness of third parties' conduct,
distribution of the marital estate after the insured' s death, marital debts for which
the surviving spouse remained liable, and likelihood spousal maintenance would
have been awarded to the surviving spouse, should also be considered.

Id.
The Court in American Family Life Insurance reasoned that its decision would
"not encourage wholesale disobedience of temporary court orders ... " and recognized that
this issue "arises only in limited circumstances: when the insured who wrongfully
changes his beneficiary dies between the issuance of the restraining order and a final
resolution in the dissolution action." Id.
The application of the foregoing equitable analysis is appropriate to the instant
case. The Respondent's position that the violation of the Joint Temporary Restraining
Order can only be remedied by a contempt action is not practical in a situation such as the
one presented in the instant case.
C. The District Court improperly awarded attorney fees pursuant to Idaho
Code§§ 12-120(3) and 15-8-208.

The Respondent argues that the District Court awarded attorney fees pursuant to
Idaho Code § 12-120(3). In support of this position, the Respondent cites Continental
Cas. Co. v. Brady, 127 Idaho 830, 835, 907 P.2d 807, 812 (1995) for the proposition that

an insurance contract is a "commercial transaction" pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).
The Respondent's reliance upon Brady is.misplaced. After Brady was decided, the Idaho
Legislature, in response to the holding in Brady, amended Idaho Code§ 41-1839. Idaho
Code§ 41-1839 now provides as follows:
ALLOWANCE OF ATTORNEY FEES IN SUITS AGAINST INSURERS. (1)
Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety,
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guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a
period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as provided
in such policy, certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto
the amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in any
action thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state for
recovery under the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay such
further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in
such action.
(2) In any such action, if it is alleged that before the commencement
thereof, a tender of the full amount justly due was made to the person
entitled thereto, and such amount is thereupon deposited in the court, and if
the allegation is found to be true, or if it is determined in such action that
no amount is justly due, then no such attorney's fees may be recovered.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of statute to the contrary, this
section and section 12-123, Idaho Code, shall provide the exclusive remedy for
the award of statutory attorney's fees in all actions between insureds and
insurers involving disputes arising under policies of insurance. Provided,
attorney's fees may be awarded by the court when it finds, from the facts
presented to it that a case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation. Section 12-120, Idaho Code, shall not
apply to any actions between insureds and insurers involving disputes arising
under any policy of insurance.

Brady involved a claim by Brady against his insurance company for failure to defend and
failure to indemnify. The Respondent attempts to boot strap the holding in Brady that any
claim .for the proceeds of an insurance policy is a "commercial transaction." The
Respondent fails to take into consideration that the inquiry is not whether a "commercial
transaction" is remotely involved in the litigation, but, rather, whether the "commercial
transaction" is the gravaman of the lawsuit. The Court has stated the proper inquiry as
follows:
[T]he award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a commercial
transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is whether the
commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees are
not appropriate under I.C. § 12-120(3) unless the commercial transaction is
integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting
to recover. To hold otherwise would be to convert the award of attorney's fees
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from an exceptional remedy justified only by statutory authority to a matter of
right in virtually every lawsuit filed.

Brower v. E.I DuPont De Nemours and Co., l l 7 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349
(1990).
While this Court has held that the fact that simply because_ the nature of the
lawsuit is that of a declaratory action does not prevent an award of attorney fees pursuant
to Idaho Code §. 12-120(3), see Frieburger v. J-U-B Engineers, 141 Idaho 415, 111 P.3d
100 (2005), the commercial transaction must be integral to the claim.

In this case, the insurance policy is not the gravamen of the lawsuit. The nature of
the claim is the entitlement to the proceeds of the insurance policy. In other words, it is
not a claim by the parties against the insurance company for the proceeds of the policy
payment, but a claim between Tammy and the Trust that is central to the lawsuit. The
gravamen is the death of Mark Dixson and the entitlement to the death proceeds. There
is no commercial relationship between the parties.

II.

CONCLUSION

Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's grant of
Summary Judgment in favor of the Trust for the reasons set forth in Appellant's Opening

Brief and the foregoing.
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